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ACTION ACCRUAL DATE FOR WRITTEN 
WARRANTIES TO REP AIR: DA TE OF 
DELIVERY OR DATE OF FAILURE TO 
REPAIR? 
Written warranties are commonly offered in sales transactions, 
especially those involving durable goods such as appliances, tools, and 
automobiles. Such warranties frequently contain provisions in which 
the seller promises to repair or replace the goods should they prove 
defective within a specified period (repair provision). In an informal 
survey,' approximately ninety-six percent of written warranties examined 
contained a repair provision and thus were "repair warranties." In 
addition, about half of the warranties examined made no promise 
regarding the condition of the goods or stated that repair was the seller's 
sole obligation (sole repair warranty). 2 
The Uniform Commercial Code establishes the period during which 
a buyer with a warranty claim must sue. Under Code section 2-725, 3 
I. In this survey, 56 warranties were examined. There is no guarantee that these warranties 
are representative of the full range of warranties in the market today. This group does, however, 
include many warranties offered to the average consumer. Warranties from 16 product categories 
were examined, including sporting goods, automobiles, watches, kitchen utensils, pens, electronic 
games, shoes, calculators, small, medium, and large sized appliances, tools, cameras, lawn mowers, 
typewriters, cosmetics, plumbing implements, and mattresses. 
2. For example, Sears, the nation's number one retailer, see Corporate Scoreboard, Bus. 
WK., March 14, 1983, at 65, 86 (1982 sales), and General Motors, the world's largest auto maker, 
see How the G.M. Toyota deal buys time, Bus. WK., Feb. 28, 1983, at 32, have apparently 
uniformly adopted sole repair warranties for their products. (Sears warranty information is limited 
to Sears brand products.) 
Other findings as to the frequency of certain warranty characteristics: 
(I) Approximately 700/o (39/56) of warranties examined contained a provision promising that 
the product was free from defects (no-defects provision). 
(2) Approximately 170/o (6/35) of warranties containing both a no-defects provision and a 
repair provision (dual warranties) contained a time limitation only in the repair provision. 
(3) Approximately 570/o (32/56) of warranties examined had at least one of the two following 
characteristics: (a) contained a time term only in the repair provision; (b) were sole warranties 
to repair. 
(4) Approximately 70% (26/37) of warranties examined contained a disclaimer of seller's respon-
sibility for product failure due to abuse or misuse. 
For formal compilations of the frequency of some warranty characteristics including, inter 
alia, warranty period duration, damages exclusions, limitations on implied warranties, and limita-
tions on transferability, see generally Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 
YALE L.J. 1297 (1981); Gerner & Bryant, Appliance Warranties as a Market Signal?, 15 J. CON-
SUMER AFF. 75 (1981); Note, An Empirical Study of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 31 STAN. 
L. REV. 1117 (1979). 
3. The language of U.C.C. § 2-725, in relevant part, is as follows: 
(I) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four 
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the limitations period for warranty actions (and for actions on con-
tracts for the sale of goods generally) is four years. If the warranty 
is a simple promise that the goods are free from defects (no-defects 
warranty), this four-year period begins on the date the goods are 
delivered. The limitations period may begin at a different time, however, 
if the warranty contains a repair provision, e~pecially where there is 
no promise that the goods are not defective. 4 
This Note argues that the statute of limitations for an action for 
breach of a repair warranty should begin to run not when the goods 
are delivered (on-delivery rule), but when the manufacturer has failed 
to repair the goods (failure-to-repair rule). Part I considers the current 
division of authority relating to the action accrual date (the date at 
which the limitations period begins) for repair warranties. It analyzes 
the issue of whether the repair warranty is a species of future perfor-
mance warranty under section 2-725(2) and examines non-Code law 
on repair promises. Part II discusses the advantages and disadvantages 
of allowing the statute of limitations to begin running only after the 
manufacturer has failed to repair. Part III concludes that a failure-to-
repair rule -best serves the purposes of the Code's rules regarding pro-
spective warranties (those that promise performance at a future time) 
and proposes an amendment to section 2-725 to this end. 5 
years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may 
reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it. 
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved 
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender 
of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to the future perfor-
mance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such perfor-
mance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. 
4. Typical of a sole repair warranty might be this provision: 
For one year from date of purchase, when this Air Conditioner is operated and main-
tained for normal room cooling according to owner's instructions attached to or fur-
nished with the product, [Manufacturer] will repair this Air Conditioner free of charge, 
if defective in material or workmanship. 
A dual warranty promising both that the product was not defective and that it would be repaired 
if it were found to be defective might be as follows: 
All parts of the [Manufacturer's] faucet are warranted to the original consumer pur-
chaser to be free from defects in material and workmanship for a period of five years 
from the date of purchase. [Manufacturer] will replace, free of charge, during the war-
ranty period, any part which proves defective in material and/or workmanship under 
normal installation, use, and service. THIS WARRANTY IS LIMITED TO DEFEC-
TIVE PARTS REPLACEMENT ONLY. LABOR CHARGES AND/OR DAMAGE 
INCURRED IN INSTALLATION, REPAIR, OR REPLACEMENT AS WELL AS 
INCIDENT AL AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES CONNECTED THEREWITH 
ARE EXCLUDED. Any damage to this faucet as a result of misuse, abuse, neglect, 
accident, improper installation, or any use violative of instructions furnished by us, 
WILL VOID THE WARRANTY. 
5. This analysis does not consider the action accrual date for implied warranties. In almost 
all cases involving implied warranties the action is held to accrue at the date of delivery. See, 
e.g., Clark v. De Laval Separator Corp, 639 F.2d 1320, 1325 (5th Cir. 1981); Holdridge v. Heyer-
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I. THE CURRENT CONFUSION REGARDING THE ACTION ACCRUAL DATE 
FOR BREACH OF A REPAIR WARRANTY 
Courts applying the Uniform Commercial Code and courts looking 
beyond Code language have addressed the issue of when the statute 
of limitations should begin to run on an action for breach of a repair 
warranty. Cases applying the Code language generally construe a repair 
provision as a limitation of remedies for breach of warranty but fail 
to address adequately the question of when, given such a construc-
tion, the limitations period should begin. Courts not applying Code 
language have concluded that breach of a repair warranty occurs only 
upon the seller's failure to repair and therefore that the statute can 
begin running only at this point. 
A. The Uniform Commercial Code's Answer 
The general rule of section 2-725(2) is that an action for breach of 
warranty accrues on the date of delivery. 6 Under the same subsection, 
however, the general rule does not apply where a warranty explicitly 
extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach 
must await such performance. 7 In such cases, the action accrues when 
Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1103 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (and cases cited therein); J. WHITE 
& R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 419 n.73 (2d ed. 
1980); Annot., 93 A.L.R.3D 690, 692-96 (1979 & Supp. 1983). Moreover, in almost all of the 
decisions considered here, the parties had contracted for the sale of goods. Contracts for services 
may be denied Code treatment. See H. Hirschfield Sons Co. v. Colt Indus., 107 Mich. App. 
720, 724-27, 309 N.W.2d 714, 716-17 (1981); Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 
F. Supp. 262, 275 (D. Maine 1977) (and authorities cited). Thus, if a manufacturer's repair obliga-
tion/agreement were viewed as a separate services contract, the Code might be inapplicable. Where 
services are incidental to the sale of goods, however, U .C.C. § 2-725(2) is applicable. See Tele-
Radio Sys. Ltd. v. De Forest Elecs., Inc., 92 F.R.D. 371, 374 (D.N.J. 1981) (citiPg Triangle 
Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1979)); see also Shapiro v. 
Long Island Lighting Co., 71 A.D.2d 671, 418 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1979). Because a contract for 
the sale of goods is involved here, the U.C.C. is applicable. Hence, regardless of what the action 
accrual date is determined to be, the rule in U.C.C. § 2-725(1), quoted supra note 3, that actions 
for breach of contract for the sale of goods must be commenced within four years of the action 
accrual date is applicable. 
6. See supra note 3. 
7. Id. Two commentators have undertaken to analyze judicial treatment (to 1974) of the 
§ 2-725(2) future performance exception with respect to a broad range of arguably prospective 
warranties, including warranties as to the quality of goods and warranties of title, and have 
advocated radical changes in the language and sweep of the exception. See Schmitt & Hanko, 
For Whom the Bell Tolls-An Interpretation of the U.C. C. 's Exception as to Accrual of a Cause 
of Action for Future Performance Warranties, 28 ARK. 1: REV. 311 (1974). The analytical focus 
of this Note is much narrower, reaching only warranties that contain repair provisions. In par-
ticular, this Note examines the critical issue of construction of the repair provision as a remedy 
limitation that cannot receive the benefit of the Code's general rule or exception for warranties. 
This construction is unique to the repair provision and therefore is left entirely unexamined by 
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the breach is or reasonably should have been discovered. 8 
1. Repair Warranties as Remedy Limitations Incapable of Extend-
ing to Future Performance- Because product repair promises are 
warranties9 - or are at least labeled as such 10 - application of sec-
tion 2-725 to repair warranties is facially appropriate. Thus, such war-
ranties may be subject to the section 2-725 action accrual date rules. 
Moreover, repair promises with specific duration terms are arguably 
explicit extensions to future performance, and, as such, the statute of 
limitations may begin to run only after discovery of the breach. 11 
the above described work. Moreover, the "Proposal for Revised § 2-725" offered by Schmitt 
& Hanko, given the prevailing construction of repair provisions as remedies, would not allow 
such provisions prospective treatment. See infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
8. See supra note 3. Doubtless the issue of when a breach of a repair obligation is "discovered" 
would often arise if the statute of limitations for such an obligation were held to run at a point 
later than delivery. Section 2-725(2) requires that where such a warranty explicitly extends to 
future performance and discovery must await such performance, the action accrues at the date 
at which the breach is or reasonably should have been discovered. The reasonable opportunity 
for early discovery has been found to be important on several occasions. See, e.g., Holdridge 
v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1101 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Gemini Typographers v. 
Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 48 A.D.2d 637,638, 368 N.Y.S.2d 210, 212 (1975); see also Voth 
v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 648-49, 545 P.2d 371, 376 (1976); Rochester Welding 
Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 984, 433 N. Y.S.2d 888, 889-90 (I 980) (Doerr, 
J., dissenting). When the manufacturer's only obligation is to repair or replace, a reasonable 
interpretation is that discovery occurs when the manufacturer has clearly failed or refused to 
repair. This interpretation is consistent with the common law rule that breach of a conditional 
contract can occur only upon the occurrence of the condition. See infra note 91. 
9. See Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 998, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778, 784, 14 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 610, 617 (1974) ("a promise to repair is an express warranty 
that the promise to repair will be honored"), rev'd on other grounds, 50 A.D.2d 866, 376 N. Y.S.2d 
948 (1975); Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 821 n.17 (6th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979). 
10. A court may well find that a repair provision is not a warranty at all. See infra notes 
18-33 and accompanying text. 
I I. In practice, the explicit extension standard has been difficult to meet. Because § 2-725(2) 
requires that warranties explicitly extend to future performance of the goods to be excepted from 
the on-delivery rule, courts have ruled that "there must be a specific reference to a future time 
in the warranty. As a result of this harsh construction, most express warranties cannot meet 
the test." Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 820 (6th Cir. 1978), 
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); accord Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Central Eng'g & Equip. 
Co., 61 I P .2d 863, 870-71 (Wyo. 1980); see also R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 
697 F.2d 818,823 (8th Cir. 1983); Voth v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 651, 545 P.2d 
371, 377 (1976); Centennial Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 74 Mich. App. 169, 172,253 N.W.2d 
696, 697 (1977). In some cases, however, provisions not stating a general time at which future 
performance will occur have qualified as explicit extensions. See generally Annot., 93 A.L.R.3o 
690 (1979); Schmitt & Hanko, supra note 7. Nevertheless, it has been very clear in many cases 
that the manufacturer's performance would occur in the future. See Rempe v. General Elec. 
Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 160, 254 A.2d 577 (1969); U.S. Indus. v. Mitchell, 148 Ga. App. 770, 
252 S.E.2d 672 (1980); Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 
433 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1980); Mittasch v. Seal Lock Burial Vault, Inc., 42 A.D.2d 573,344 N.Y.S.2d 
IOI (1973); Perry v. Augustine, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 416, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 735 
(Mercer County Ct. C.P. 1965); see also infra text accompanying notes 39-54. 
Warranties providing merely that a product would function as intended have generally been 
found insufficiently explicit. See Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 
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Nevertheless, several courts have concluded that repair warranties 
do not explicitly extend to future performance of the goods under Code 
section 2-725(2) so that the statute of limitations begins to run at 
delivery. 12 In fact, the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that the 
"weight of authority" was such that a warranty to repair should not 
be found to explicitly extend to future performance under section 
2-725(2). 13 In the view of these courts, the section 2-725(2) exception 
applies only in situations where future performance of the product is 
promised. 14 The exception applies, by its terms, only "where a war-
819-20 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 
440 F. Supp. l088, 1 !03 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Nassau Roofing and Sheet Metal Co., Inc. v. Celotex 
Corp., 74 A.D.2d 679,681,424 N.Y.S.2d 786, 788 (1980). Even more detailed warranties specifying 
precisely what sort of performance can be expected of a product have not been found sufficient-
ly explicit. See Raymond-Dravo-Langenfelder v. Microdot, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 614, 618 (D. Del. 
1977); Binkley Co. v. Teledyne Mid-Am. Corp., 333 F. Supp. 1183, 1186-87 (E.D. Mo. 1971), 
aff'd, 460 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1972); see also Homan Dev. Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 63 A.D.2d 
727, 405 N. Y .S.2d 3 IO (I 978). Some courts holding arguably prospective warranties to be merely 
present in nature have held that such warranties "constitute a representation of the product's 
condition at the time of delivery and do not make any reference to future time." See Holdridge 
v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. !088, 1!03-04 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Thalrose v. General Motors 
Corp., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1257, 1258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971); see also Citizens Util. 
Co. v. American Locomotive Co., 11 N.Y.2d 418, 184 N.E.2d 171, 230 N.Y.S.2d 194 (1962). 
A promise that a product is "capable" of a given performance, however, is essentially an indica-
tion of the condition of the product at the time of delivery. See Homart Dev. Co. v. Graybar 
Elec. Co., 63 A.D.2d 727, 405 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1978). By contrast, the repair promise does not 
relate to the present condition of the goods. Thus, reliance on this line of authority is misplaced 
where a repair warranty is involved. 
12. See Hansen v. F.M.C. Corp., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 828, 833 (D. Kan. 1981); 
Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 651-52, 545 P.2d _371, 378 (1976); Centennial 
Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 74 Mich. App. 169, 171, 253 N.W.2d 696, 697 (1977); Commis-
sioners of Fire Dist. No. 9, Iselin, Woodbridge, N.J. v. American La France, 176 N.J. Super. 
566, 573, 424 A.2d 441, 445 (1980); Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 999, 
354 N.Y.S.2d 778, 785, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 610, 617 (1974), rev'd, 50 A.D.2d 
866, 376 N. Y .S.2d 948 (1975) (six-year tort statute rather than Code's four-year sales-contract 
statute applicable); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Central Eng'g & Equip. Co., 61 I P .2d 863, 
871 (Wyo. 1980); see also Benco Plastics, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 387 F. Supp. 772, 
781 & n.13, 784 (E.D. Tenn. 1974). 
Although some of these decisions concern suits for personal injuries allegedly sustained as 
a result of product defects (and therefore may be reasonable in finding that a repair obligation 
cannot be the basis of a personal injury claim), these courts' analysis of the § 2-725(2) future 
performance issue may influence other courts deciding cases involving solely economic loss. But 
see Voth, 218 Kan. at 647, 545 P.2d at 374-75 (defects warranty present); Hansen, 32 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. at 832 (same). For example, Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co. has been cited relatively 
often in such cases. See R.W. Murray·Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 529 F. Supp. 297, 299 
(E.D. Mo. 1981), rev'd, 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1983); Shapiro v. Long Island Lighting Co., 
71 A.D.2d 671,671,418 N.Y.S.2d 948,950 (1979); Commissioners of Fire Dist. No. 9, Iselin, 
Woodbridge, N.J. v. American La France, 176 N.J. Super. 566,573,424 A.2d 441,445 (1980). 
13. See Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Central Eng'g and Equip. Co., 61 I P.2d 863, 871 
& n.9 (Wyo. 1980). The court addressed the future performance issue after it found that the 
issue of whether the warranty period should have been tolled during repairs, cf. infra note 98, 
was "tie[d) into (and) intimately related to the concept that the warranty is one of future perfor-
mance." Id. at 871. 
14. See Hansen v. F.M.C. Corp., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 828, 833 (D. Kan. 1981); 
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ranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods." 15 A repair 
provision promises repair of the goods should they prove defective, 
not performance of the goods themselves. 16 Thus, under this analysis, 
the section 2-725(2) future performance exception is inapplicable to 
repair warranties. 11 
Because classifying a warranty as a promise of future performance 
of the goods brings it within section 2-725(2)'s exception to the delivery 
Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 651-52, 545 P.2d 371, 378 (1976); Centennial 
Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 74 Mich. App. 169, 171, 253 N.W.2d 696, 697 (1977); Commis-
sioners of Fire Dist. No. 9, lselin, Woodbridge, N.J. v. American La France, 176 N.J. Super. 
566, 573, 424 A.2d 441, 445 (1980); Owens v. Patent· Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 999, 
354 N.Y.S.2d 778, 785, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 610,617 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 
50 A.D.2d 866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975) (six-year tort statute rather than Code's four-year sales-
contract statute applies); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Central Eng'g & Equip. Co., 61 I P.2d 
863, 871 (Wyo. 1980); see also Grand Island School Dist. No. 2 v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 568, 
279 N.W.2d 603, 609 (1979); Shapiro v. Long Island Lighting Co., 71 A.D.2d 671, 671, 418 
N.Y.S.2d 948,950 (1979); cf. Brauer v. Republic Steel Corp., 460 F.2d 801,803 (10th Cir. 1972) 
(pre-U .C.C. law substantially in accordance with § 2-725(2); "durability" warranted); Holdridge 
v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1 JOI (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (pre-Code law in accord with 
U .C.C. § 2-725(2); both "present" and "prospective" warranties relate to "state" or "condi-
tion" of goods); Matlack, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 972,975 (E.D. Pa. 1966) ("per-
formance of the engines"); Wilson v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 21 Ill. App. 3d 867, 872, 315 N.E.2d 
580, 584 (1974) (§ 2-725(2) exception required explicit warranty as to "performance of the trac-
tor" in question); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 92 Ill. App. 3d 136, 153-54, 414 
N.E.2d 1302, 1315-16 (1980) (following Wilson; performance of "product"), rev'd on other 
grounds, 91 III. 2d 69,435 N.E.2d 443 (1982); Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. I, 
12, 342 A.2d 181, 186-87 (1975) (non-U.C.C. law; warranty as to future "condition" must be 
explicit; repair warranty distinguished). 
15. U.C.C. § 2-725 (quoted supra note 3) (emphasis added). The exception also requires that 
"discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance." Id. This language similarly 
suggests that the Code drafters contemplated warranties that promised product performance begin-
ning at the date of delivery, the breach of which promise was merely not apparent at delivery. 
See also infra note 112 and accompanying text. 
16. Often a court will construe a warranty containing both a repair provision and a no-defects 
provision, one or both of which contain a time term, see supra note 11; see also infra notes 
23 & 61, as not promising performance of the goods and therefore as nonprospective under 
U.C.C. § 2-725(2). See generally supra note 14. 
17. Nonetheless, it is arguable that repair warranties do relate to performance of the goods 
and therefore can qualify as an explicit extension under subsection two of U.C.C. § 2-725. Although 
such warranties do not state that the goods will perform without defect, they do, in effect, en-
sure the performance of the goods by obligating the manufacturer to repair the goods when 
any defect manifests itself. See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 
I 08 I, I 085 (3d Cir. 1980) (purpose of repair remedy is to give buyer goods that conform to 
the contract); accord Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 426 (D. Del. 1973); see 
also Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 984, 433 N.Y.S.2d 
888, 889 (1980) (where contract provided that "sole remedy" in event of defect was "correction 
of defect" by seller, contract explicitly extended to future performance under U.C.C. § 2-725(2) 
in that contract extended "to the future successful programming" that the parties agreed the 
defendant would have); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 356 (Minn. 1977) 
("repair and replacement clause provides . . . a remedy to the buyer, whereby he may secure 
goods conforming to the contract ... "). Because the Code is to be "liberally construed and 
applied to promote its underlying policies and purposes," U.C.C. § 1-102(1), a court might validly 
effect the policy of§ 2-725, see infra text accompanying note 94, by construing a repair provi-
sion as a "future performance" warranty. 
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rule, other classifications tend to accompany a finding that the excep-
tion is inapplicable and that the warranty in question is subject to the 
on-delivery rule. Courts concluding that repair warranties do not satisfy 
the "goods" requirement of the section 2-725(2) exception typically 
find that repair provisions are remedy limitations. 18 This is not to say 
that finding a repair provision to be a remedy limitation is, in itself, 
unreasonable 19 under the Code. In fact, two Code provisions provide 
18. This seems to be the approach taken by the majority of courts considering the issue. 
A clear majority of courts subscribe to the view that repair warranties do not promise perfor-
mance of the goods under U.C.C. § 2-725(2). See supra note 14 and accompanying text. While, 
of this group, only Centennial Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 74 Mich. App. 169, 171,253 N.W.2d 
696, 697 (1977), and Commissioners of Fire Dist. No. 9, lselin, Woodbridge, N.J. v. American 
La France, 176 N.J. Super. 566,573,424 A.2d 441,445 (1980), have explicitly identified repair 
provisions as remedy limitations, see infra text accompanying notes 24 & 28, most of the other 
decisions that find the warranty to be breached at delivery describe the manufacturer's obliga-
tion as something triggered only when the goods fail. See, e.g., Hansen v. F.M.C. Corp., 32 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 828, 833 (D. Kan. 1981); Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 
Kan. 644, 651-52, 545 P.2d 371, 375, 378 (1976); Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 
2d 992, 999, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778, 785, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 610, 617 (1974), rev'd 
on other grounds, 50 A.D.2d 866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Cen-
tral Eng'g & Equip. Co., 611 P.2d 863, 871 (Wyo. 1980); see also Standard Alliance Indus. 
v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813,821 n.17 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979), 
(finding that Voth had adopted a remedy approach). That is, most courts denying repair warran-
ties prospective treatment have implicitly identified the repair provision as a "mere" remedy 
limitation. See also infra note 51. By contrast, few courts identifying repair provisions as remedy 
limitations have held that the statute begins running at any time after delivery. See infra notes 
39-57 and accompanying text. 
19. Identifying the repair provision as a limitation of remedies for breach of warranty makes 
the most sense where there is an underlying promise that the goods are not defective. Such a 
promise is the warranty while the repair provision is arguably the remedy. If the warranty con-
tains no promise regarding defects, see, e.g., Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v .. Central Eng'g & 
Equip. Co., 61 I P.2d 863, 871 (Wyo. 1980); Commissioners of Fire Dist. No. 9, Iselin, Wood-
bridge, N.J. v. American La France, 176 N.J. Super. 566, 572-73, 424 A.2d 441, 445 (1980); 
see also supra note 4, then this approach seems less sensible. In this situation, if the repair provi-
sion is a remedy limitation, there may be no warranty. This finding has an important implica-
tion: the basis under§ 2-316(4) and§ 2-719(1)(a) for finding that a repair provision is a limita-
tion of "remedies for breach of warranty" may be eliminated.(§ 2-719(1)(a) seems to contemplate 
only warranties that promise that the goods are not defective in that it identifies the repair remedy 
as a means of redressing the problem of "non-conforming goods or parts.") Moreover, where 
a court finds that even a warranty containing both a promise regarding defects or product per-
formance and a repair provision does not relate to the goods, see, e.g., Hansen v. F.M.C. Corp., 
32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 828, 833 (D. Kan. 1981); see also supra note 14 and accompa-
nying text, a finding that a repair provision is a limitation of remedy for breach of warranty 
may similarly be questioned. In both instances, as official comment two to§ 2-316 states, "[i]f 
no warranty exists, there is of course no problem of limiting remedies for breach of warranty." 
U.C.C. § 2-316, Off. Comm. 2; cf. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 484 (there can 
be no warranty if the seller has disclaimed warranties). 
Nevertheless, the Code, by suggesting limitation of remedies via repair provisions in § 2-7 I 9(1 )(a), 
encourages ihe courts to construe the repair warranty in this fashion. See infra note 20; cf. 15 
U.S.C. § 2301(10) (1982). Moreover, even if a repair provision could not qualify as a limitation 
of express warranty, it might arguably qualify as a remedy limitMion for any implied warranties 
(such as warranties implied in law under the Magnuson Moss Warranty Act (see 15 U.S.C. § 
2308(a) (1982)). A limitation of remedy, however, may well be found to apply only to an accom-
panying express warranty. See Water Works & Indus. Supply Co. v. Wilburn, 437 S.W.2d 951 
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a substantial basis for identifying repair prov1s10ns as remedy 
limitations. 20 Nevertheless, such a finding has meant, in all but a few 
cases,2' that the on-delivery rule must be applied. 22 
(Ky. App. 1968); Holloway v. General Motors Corp., 60 Mich. App. 208, 230 N.W.2d 380 (1975), 
aff'd on other grounds, 399 Mich. 617, 250 N.W.2d 736 (1977), rev'd on other grounds, 403 
Mich. 614,271 N.W.2d 777 (1978); National Cash Register Co. v. Adell Indus., 57 Mich. App. 
413, 225 N.W.2d 785 (1975), J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 464 n.153; Annot., 2 
A.L.R.4TH 576, 589 (1980 & Supp. 1983); see also Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp. v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 35 Cal. App. 3d 948, 957-60, Ill· Cal. Rptr. 210, 216-17 (1973); Jarnot 
v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 428, 156 A.2d 568, 571 (1959); cf. Ventura v. Ford 
Motor Corp., 180 N.J. Super. 45, 61-{i2, 433 A.2d 801, 809-810 (App. Div. 1981). Where such 
a remedy limitation is held to apply to implied warranties, such application should and will be 
stated expressly in the warranty. See, e.g., Southwest Forest Indus. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
422 F.2d 1013, 1015 n.2, 1019 (9th Cir. 1970); Orrox Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 
441,442 (M.D. Ala. 1975); Schultz v. Jackson, 67 Ill. App. 3d 889,891,893,385 N.E.2d 162, 
163, 165 (1979); see also U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b); Council Bros. v. Ray Burner Co., 473 F.2d 400, 
406 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1973); Wyatt Indus. v. Publiker Indus., 420 F.2d 454, 456 (5th Cir. 1969); 
Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943, 947 (Ind. App. 1982). Thus, where there is no such 
express statement, it seems inaccurate to identify the repair provision as a remedy limitation. 
20. U.C.C. § 2-316(4) provides that "[r]emedies for breach of warranty can be limited in 
accordance with the provisions of this Article on liquidation of damages and on contractual 
modification of remedy." Section 2-719, the Article Two provision on contractual modification 
of remedy, explicitly authorizes the parties to limit the "buyer's remedies to return of the goods 
and repayment of the price or to repair or replacement of nonconforming goods or parts 
... " U .C.C. § 2- 7 I 9(1 }(a) (emphasis added). Not surprisingly, given this Code language, many 
courts (not considering the applicability of the statute of limitations) have in fact treated such 
repair/replacement provisions as attempts to create exclusive remedies. See Posttape Assocs. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1976); Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. 
Supp. 423, 426 (D. Del. 1973); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., IO U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 53, 57 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1972); Orange Motors, Inc. v. Dade County 
Dairies, Inc., 258 So.2d 319, 320, IO U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 325, 326-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1972); Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Ky. App. 1978); see also Patron Avia-
tion, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 154 Ga. App. 13, 16, 267 S.E.2d 274, 278 (1980); Kusens 
v. Bodyguard Rustproofing Co., 23 Ohio Op. 3d 440, 440, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
530, 531 (Ct. App. I 980); Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions, 
64 CORNELL L. REV. 30, 226 n.829 (1978). See generally U.C.C. Case Dig., 2719.4 (1981 & Supp. 
1982); U.C.C. Case Dig. 1 2316.12(6) (1982 & Supp. 1982); U.C.C. § 2-719, IA U.L.A. 500 
n.7 (1976 & Supp. 1983). 
21. See infra notes 39-54 and accompanying text. 
22. The identification of the repair provision as a remedy limitation may itself suggest an 
answer to the question of the action accrual date. Although the Code's definition of "remedy" 
is circular regarding its description of what it is that becomes available to one who possesses 
a remedial right, it does make it clear that "aggrieved" parties possess such rights: " 'Remedy' 
means any remedial right to which an aggrieved party is entitled with or without resort to a 
tribunal." U.C.C. § 1-201(34). See also U.C.C. § 1-201(2) (aggrieved party is one entitled to 
resort to a remedy); U.C.C. § 1-201(36) (" 'rights' includes remedies"). The present availability 
of a remedy thus seems to indicate that the seller has already breached its obligation under the 
warranty: "[O]bligations and remedies are counterparts; when the seller fails to do what he is 
required to do by the contract, i.e., fails to perform his obligation, the buyer may invoke an 
appropriate remedy." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 482 n.236; see Ford Motor 
Co. v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176,184,465 S.W.2d 80, 85 (1971); Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo 
Corp., 436 F. Supp. 262, 277 n.18 (D. Maine 1977); Casady v. Casady, 31 Utah 394, 399-400, 
88 P. 32, 34 (1906) (citing POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES 463-64 (4th ed. 1904) (remedial right springs 
into being as consequence of plaintiffs primary right)); see also Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434 
N.E.2d 943, 952-53 (Ind. App. 1982) (limitation of remedy "restricts remedy available once 
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Thus, in Centennial Insurance Co. v. General Electric Co., 23 the 
Michigan Court of Appeals analyzed a repair provision as "a specifica-
tion of remedy to which the buyer is entitled should breach be discovered 
within the first year." 24 As such, the repair provision could not war-
rant "performance" of the goods, and was not entitled, as plaintiff 
had argued, to prospective treatment (application of a later-than-delivery 
action accrual date) under section 2-725(2). 25 Thus, the warranty had 
been breached and the limitations period had begun on the date of 
delivery. 26 The court indicated that any ambiguity concerning the proper 
construction of the repair provision should be resolved in favor of a 
nonprospective construction because section 2-725(2) required that a 
future performance warranty be explicitly stated. 27 
Another court found that a " 'conditional' warranty for a period 
of one year from date of delivery involving only a remedy - i.e. repair 
or replacement related to defective material or workmanship'' did not 
constitute a warranty explicitly extending to future performance of the 
goods. 28 As in Centennial, the court found that the remedy provision 
containing the promise to repair or replace did not warrant product29 
performance and thus could not receive prospective treatment. 30 
This approach, however, is unsound. If a court finds that a repair 
provision is not within the terms of section 2-725(2)'s future perfor-
mance exception because it does not promise performance of the goods, 
a breach has been established"); Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 83 N.J. 320, 330, 416 
A.2d 394, 399 (1980) (same); J. WmTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 472 (same). But see 
Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F .2d 813, 821 n.17 (6th Cir. I 978), cert. 
denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979). Where a repair provision is identified as a remedy, the implication 
is therefore that this provision exists to redress the breach of another obligation - most likely 
an underlying warranty against defects. But only where the underlying warranty (if one exists) 
can, by its terms, be breached at a time after delivery may the remedial right itself accrue at 
a time after delivery. See infra note 51. But see infra note 90. 
23. 74 Mich. App. 169, 253 N.W.2d 696 (1977). In Centennial the court considered a war-
ranty that promised that the product was not defective and that if defects appeared within one 
year they would be corrected. Id. at 171 n.l, 253 N.W.2d at 697 n.1. The court denied the 
entire warranty prospective treatment. Id. at 171-72, 253 N. W .2d at 697. The presence of a war-
ranty of performance of the goods, however, arguably brings the Centennial warranty within 
the terms of § 2-725(2)'s future performance exception. One might object that the time term 
(one year) is contained in the repair provision, not the defects provision. See id. Because the 
court concluded, however, that the repair provision was only a remedy limitation, id., it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the time term was a statement of the no-defects warranty's effective 
period. 




28. See Commissioners of Fire District No. 9 Iselin, Woodbridge, N .J. v. American La France, 
176 N.J. Super. 566, 572-73, 424 A.2d 441, 445 (1980). The court did not provide an exact 
quotation of the repair warranty. Id. A separate warranty against defects was held to satisfy 
the § 2-725(2) exception's requirements. Id. 
29. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
30. 176 N.J. Super. at 573, 424 A.2d at 445. 
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its analysis is incomplete. This approach assumes that section 2-725(2)'s 
general rule of action accrual at "tender of delivery" 31 is applicable 
because a repair provision does not warrant performance of the goods. 
The on-delivery rule itself, however, applies only in situations involv-
ing breach of a "warranty," 32 which, under the Code, must also relate 
to the goods. 33 If a court views a repair provision as a remedy limita-
tion not extending to product performance rather than as a warranty, 
the on-delivery rule should not apply to that 34 provision. 35 The parties 
may still look to section 2-725(2)'s first sentence, which provides that 
the cause of action accrues "when the breach occurs." 36 This provi-
sion is not limited to promises that relate to the goods. 37 It is clear, 
31. See U.C.C. § 2-725(2). 
32. Id. 
33. See U.C.C. § 2-313(1), (2). 
34. The general on-delivery rule would arguably apply, however, to any no-defects obliga-
tion (either implied or express) not applicable in the future, because such provisions are "war-
ranties" under the Code. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-725. But see infra note 41 (breach of repair 
obligation can be separated from that of no-defects obligation). 
35. U.C.C. § 2-313's requirement that an express warranty "relate" to the goods, see U.C.C. 
§ 2-313(1), (2), is arguably broader than the § 2-725(2) requirement that a warranty explicitly 
extend to future performance of the goods. Thus, aside from the issue of the intended future 
operation of a warranty, a provision could qualify as an express warranty and yet not be ex-
cepted from § 2-725(2)'s general rule of action accrual at delivery. 
A promise to repair, however, does not satisfy the § 2-313 "relate to the goods" requirement, 
which is merely a codification of the generally accepted view of warranties as promises relating 
to the quality of the goods. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 16, 403 P.2d 145, 
150, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 33, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 915, 919-20 (1965) (Traynor, C.J.); 
D. EPSTEIN & J. MARTIN, BASIC UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 320 (2d ed. 1983); Note, Uniform 
Commercial Code-A Limited Remedy Fails of Its Essential Purpose Only In The Case Of a 
Negligent or Willful Repudiation of the Remedy, 51 TEX. L. REV. 383, 386 (1973); cf. Hahn 
v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943, 952-53 (Ind. App. 1982) (disclaimer or modification of 
warranty eliminates quality commitment). A repair provision relates not to the goods and their 
quality, but to the manufacturer and its obligation to the purchaser. See Owens v. Patent Scaf-
folding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 999, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778, 784, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 
610,617 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 50 A.D.2d 866,376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975). To construe 
§ 2-313 broadly enough to include repair provisions might make it meaningless: "[i]f a promise 
to repair relates to the goods, then so would nearly every provision in the contract of sale." 
Special Project, supra note 20, at 226. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act concedes the distinc-
tion between a promise that "relates to the nature of the material or workmanship" and "any 
undertaking ... in connection with the sale ... to refund, repair, replace, or take remedial 
action with respect to such product" by separating these descriptions into subsections in its definition 
of written warranty. See 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(A), (B) (1975); cf. CAL. CIVIL CoDE § 1791.2(a)(I) 
(Deering 1981). In stark contrast, the Code's definition of warranty contains only "relates to 
the goods" language and therefore does not reach repair provisions. See Eddy, Effects of the 
Magnuson-Moss Act upon Consumer Product Warranties, 55 N.C.L. REV. 835, 853-54 (1977); 
see also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 370; Matlack, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 253 
F. Supp. 972, 976 (E.D. Pa. 1976). But see supra note 17. Moreover, a court's finding that 
a repair provision is a remedy limitation constitutes an implicit recognition of the fact that such 
a provision is not a warranty under the Code. See Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176, 184, 
465 S.W.2d 80, 85 (1971). Thus, a repair "warranty" falls beyond the scope of both the future 
performance exception and the on-delivery rule. 
36. See U .C.C. § 2-725(2). 
37. Id. But see infra note 112. 
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however, that neither of the Code's· rules for determining when the 
breach occurs - the on-delivery rule and the future performance ex-
ception - applies to repair warranties. Thus, neither of these provi-
sions can determine the date of breach for such warranties. 
2. Future Performance Exception as Applicable to Repair Warran-
ties Despite Characterization as a Remedy Limitation- Many courts 38 
have adopted the Centennial approach and have found that because 
a repair provision is merely a remedy limitation it cannot promise future 
product performance. Three courts, however, have found that 
characterizing a repair provision as a remedy limitation does not 
foreclose prospective treatment of a repair warranty under section 
2-725(2). 
In Standard Alliance Industries, Inc. v. Black Clawson Co., 39 the 
court considered a warranty that contained both a promise that the 
product was not defective and a promise that it would be repaired if 
shown to be defective within one year. The court found that the no-
defects provision explicitly extended to future performance and thus 
that the action had accrued on this provision when plaintiff had 
discovered or should have discovered the defect. 40 The court analyzed 
the repair provision separately41 and found that even though this pro-
38. See supra note 18. 
39. 587 F.2d 813, 816-17 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979). 
40. Id. at 821. 
41. In Centennial Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 74 Mich. App. 169,253 N.W.2d 696 (1977), 
the court rejected plaintiff's alternative argument that the repair provision was a separate con-
tract that could be breached separately from the contract of sale. Id. at 172, 253 N.W.2d at 
697. Nevertheless, the Centennial holding may not apply in cases in which a sole warranty to 
repair was issued. A reading of the Centennial warranty reveals that a warranty against defects 
- as well as a promise to repair - was offered. Only the promise to repair, however, extended 
for a one year period; the warranty against defects did not. Thus, the warranty against defects 
arguably was breached upon delivery, given the "future" requirement of U.C.C. § 2-725(2). 
Because the court found that the repair provision was inseparable from the warranty against 
defects, id., this provision could not be given independent construction. Where there is no at-
tached nonprospective no-defects provision, however, a repair provision might be held breached 
upon failure to repair. 
Moreover, for two reasons, Centennial should not be the rule for repair warranties in general, 
including ones that (also) promise that the product is not defective. First, a court may find that 
a repair provision may be separated from a defects provision for statute of limitations purposes. 
See Standard Alliance at 821-22 nn. 17 & 22; see also Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp. v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 35 Cal. App. 3d 948, 959, Ill Cal. Rptr. 210, 216-18 (1973); Shapiro v. 
Long Island Lighting Co., 71 A.D.2d 671, 418 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1979); Krueger v. V.P. Christian-
son Silo Co., 206 Wis. 460, 240 N.W. 145 (1932); cf. Hollin v. Libby, McNeill and Libby, 253 
Or. 8, 14, 452 P.2d 555, 558 (1969) (plaintiff has choice of awaiting second, separate breach; 
limitations period for second breach begins at later point than that for first). The Code implies 
separate breach/action acrual dates for a purchaser's different warranty actions by denying im-
plied warranties prospective treatment because they are not "explicit," while giving future per-
formance warranties a later-than-delivery breach/action accrual date. See supra notes 3 & 5; 
see also Dennin v. General Motors Corp., 78 Misc. 2d 451, 452, 357 N.Y.S. 668, 671 (1974) 
(even if action on express warranty barred by contractual limitation of limitations period, im-
plied warranty claim survives limitation). As noted above, if the provisions are separated, the 
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vision was a remedy limitation, 42 the action accrued upon defendant's 
failure to repair, 43 not the date of delivery or even the date of discovery 
of the defect. 44 Indeed, the court specifically stated that a repair pro-
vision could itself explicitly extend to future performance. 45 
Similarly, in Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 46 
the court held that a contract47 limiting the seller's remedy "in the 
event of defect" to "correction of such defect" by the seller explicitly 
extended to future performance and was breached when def end ant ad-
mitted "that it could not correct the defects. " 48 According to the court, 
the limitations period began only after this admission. 49 
In a recent case, R. W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 50 
the court found that the presence of a "limitation of remedy to replace-
ment" did not prevent a warranty against defects from extending to 
future performance under section 2-725(2). 51 The court considered two 
repair provision may be given independent prospective treatment. 
Second, the court's concern that the limitations period could be extended infinitely because 
it could be argued that each failure to remedy a breach gave rise to a new cause of action, 
74 Mich. App. at 172, 253 N.W.2d at 697, is senseless. While the purchaser may, as in Centen-
nial, argue that the repair promise is a separate obligation breached when the seller fails to repair, 
there is no later, third obligation triggered by the seller's failure to fulfill the repair obligation. 
If the warranty to repair extends for a one year period, the breach can occur, at the latest, 
one year after delivery of the product. Because under § 2-725(2) the statute of limitations runs 
for four years, the last point at which an action for breach can be brought under a date of 
failure to repair rule is the day precisely five years after delivery. But see infra note 98 (potential 
tolling). 
42. 587 F.2d at 818 n.10, 821 n.17. The court stated: 
We see no conceptual distinction between saying that a product is warranted for one 
year against defects, the remedy limited to repair or replacement and saying that, should 
a breach be discovered within one year, the seller will repair or replace defective parts. 
Both are warranties explicitly extending to future performance. We recognize that there 
may be differences between remedies and warranties, see fn. 10, but we do not believe 
that these distinctions make a difference here. 
Id. at 821 n.17. 
43. Defendant had unsuccessfully attempted to repair the goods. Id. at 818, 822 n.22. 
44. Id. at 822. See also id. n.22. 
45. Id. at 821 n.17. 
46. 78 A.D.2d 983, 433 N. Y .S.2d 888 (1980). 
47. A contract provision such as that considered in Rochester Welding Supply, id. at 983, 
433 N.Y.S.2d at 889, qualifies as a warranty. See U.C.C. § 2-313. 
48. 78 A.D.2d at 984, 433 N. Y.S.2d at 889. 
49. Id. at 983-84, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 889. The court also found that a separate contract that 
provided that the sale was "subject to the final approval" to the buyer's "satisfaction" explicitly 
extended to future performance under U.C.C. § 2-725(2). Id. at 983-84, 433 N.Y.S.2d at 888-89. 
50. 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1983). 
51. Id. at 823. The court's explanation was that it did not "believe that the presence of 
language limiting the remedy to replacement of defective materials, by itself, is determinative 
of the exact nature of the warranties in question." Id. While this decision was sensible so far 
as it went, it may have serious implications for other kinds of repair warranties. Where, for 
example, a repair warranty is a sole warranty to repair (perhaps half of all written warranties, 
see supra text accompanying note 2), see, e.g., Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs 
Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 984, 433 N.Y.S.2d 888, 889 (1980), the R. W. Murray remedy construc-
tion may mean that the future performance exception cannot apply. If the repair promise is 
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warranties, one that promised that the product would be free from 
defects for twenty years and that if it were defective, it would be 
repaired, and one that strangely seemed to promise that the product 
would repair itself. 52 The lower court had held that the action was 
barred by the statute of limitations because, being only "replacement 
commitments," the warranties could not extend to performance of the 
goods. 53 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the defendant had 
alleged the existence of warranties that explicitly extended to future 
performance of the goods. 54 Unlike the Standard Alliance55 and 
Rochester Welding56 courts, the court found that the action had ac-
crued when the defect had been or should have been discovered. 57 Ap-
parently it did not occur to the R. W. Murray court, as it had to the 
the courts in Standard Alliance and Rochester Welding, that because 
the seller had promised to repair, the action should have accrued not 
upon discovery of the defect, but upon discovery that the seller had 
failed to repair. 58 
The R. W. Murray court's interpretation is understandable, however, 
in light of its construction of the repair provision as a remedy limita-
tion that did not play a role in the determination of the action accrual 
date. 59 Because the court found that the no-defects provisions themselves 
extended to future performance, 60 the warranties could be given pro-
a remedy and there is no other promise, there may be no warranty available that can "explicitly 
extend," even where the repair promise is for a specified future period. Moreover, it is possible 
that where, as in Centennial Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 74 Mich. App. 169, 171 n.l, 253 
N.W.2d 696, 697 n.l (1977), and Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 
813, 816-17 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979), the time term of a warranty against 
defects with repair as remedy is contained only in the repair provision, the warranty might not 
explicitly extend. The theory in such a case might be that (as the court held in Centennial) the 
remedy provision cannot explicitly extend. The warranty against defects, which might otherwise 
qualify under the § 2-725(2) exception, would contain no time provision itself, and therefore 
could not warrant future performance. Thus, the division of the repair warranty into warranty 
and remedy, approved by the R. W. Murray and Centennial courts, may act to sever from a 
repair warranty the prospectiveness it might have if it were read as a whole. But see R. W. Murray, 
697 F.2d at 823 (court cited Standard Alliance, 587 F.2d at 821 & n.17, with approval). 
52. R. W. Murray, 697 F.2d at 821-22 & nn.2-3. 
53. R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 529 F. Supp. 297,299 (E.D. Mo. 1981), 
rev'd, 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1983). 
54. 697 F.2d at 818. This conclusion is questionable as to the first warranty the court con-
sidered. See id. at 821-22 & n.2. It is arguable that this provision is no more than a manufac-
turer's promise to repair. If this is the case, the court, by holding that this provision explicitly 
extended to future performance, gave a sole repair promise - a remedy limitation in the view 
of the court, see id. at 823 - prospective treatment. 
55. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
56. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
57. 697 F.2d at 824. 
58. The court seems to have read the language in Code § 2-725(2), "when the breach is or 
should have been discovered," to mean "when the nonconformance of the goods is or should 
have been discovered." 
59. See R. W. Murray, 697 F.2d at 823. 
60. Id. But see supra note 54. 
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spective treatment without consideration of the repair provisions. 61 
Nonetheless, regardless of whether a repair warranty contains a no-
defects provision extending to future performance, a finding that breach 
of the repair provision62 occurs only upon failure to repair is sensible 
because it looks to the terms of that provision to determine when the 
purchaser may initiate an action against the manufacturer. 63 
B. The Need to Look Outside the Code 
Characterizing a repair provision as a remedy limitation should not 
alter the law relating to when the purchaser may enforce a right to 
repair. 64 This is apparently what motivated the Sixth Circuit in Stan-
dard Alliance65 to decide that regardless of characterization - remedy 
or warranty - a repair provision explicitly extended to future perfor-
mance under section 2-725(2). 66 
The Standard Alliance approach, however, is not without problems. 
Although this approach produces a sound result, it ignores the "goods" 
language of the Code's exception for future performance warranties. 67 
61. Importantly, in R. W. Murray, at least one of the warranties contained a promise that 
the product would perform for a specific period of time. 697 F.2d at 822 n.3. Thus, this promise 
cou
0
ld explicitly extend to future performance. See supra note 11. In Standard Alliance Indus. 
v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 816-17 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979), 
however, only the repair provision contained a time term. Ironically, the Standard Alliance court 
also construed the repair provision as a remedy limitation, finding "no conceptual distinction 
between saying that a product is warranted for one year against defects, the remedy being limited 
to repair or replacement and saying that should a breach be discovered within one year, the 
seller will repair or replace defective parts. Both are warranties explicitly extending to future 
performance." 587 F.2d at 821 n.17. If there is in fact no difference between the two statements, 
the fact that the time term was contained in the repair provision should arguably not play a 
role in the action accrual date determination since the time term may apply, under this analysis, 
to the warranty as a whole, including the promise regarding defects. If, however, a remedy may 
not extend to future performance under U.C.C. § 2-725(2), the location of the time term is 
critical because a provision without a time term probably cannot be given prospective treatment. 
See supra note 11. If a repair provision can, as the Standard Alliance court acknowledged, ex-
tend lo future performance under U.C.C. § 2-725(2), it must be asked how such a provision 
could be breached, as the R. W. Murray court found, upon discovery of the defect rather than 
upon breach of that provision - failure to repair - as required in this section of the Code. 
(It is not clear whether the contract considered in Rochester Welding, 78 A.D.2d at 983, 433 
N.Y.S.2d at 889, contained a time term.) 
62. As to the validity of separating different warranty obligations for action accrual date 
purposes, see supra note 41. 
63. See Shapiro v. Long Island Lighting Co., 71 A.D.2d 671,671,418 N.Y.S.2d 948, 950 
(1979); Dennin v. General Motors Corp., 78 Misc. 2d 451, 452, 357 N.Y.S.2d 668, 670 (1974). 
See also infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
64. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. 
65. Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
441 U.S. 923 (1979). 
66. Id. at 821 n.17. 
67. In footnote 17 of the court's opinion (quoted supra note 42) no mention is made of 
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On the other hand, courts applying the on-delivery rule to repair pro-
visions have recognized the importance of the "goods" requirement 
but have ignored both the additional language in section 2-725(2) limiting 
the on-delivery rule to warranties68 and the obvious forward-looking 
nature of repair provisions. Thus, cases applying the Code language 
err both when they apply the on-delivery rule to repair provisions and 
when they apply the future performance exception to such provisions. 
As a result, a court considering a repair warranty is left without ap-
plicable Code language relating to the appropriate action accrual date. 
A court facing this situation, however, may decide to apply neither 
the on-delivery rule nor the future performance exception, but look 
to law outside the Code for the proper rule. 69 This is permitted, and 
probably required, by section 1-103, which provides that principles of 
law and equity not displaced by Code rules supplement the Code's 
provisions. 70 Thus, in making the determination required by section 
2-725(2) as to the date of breach,7' a court may consider and apply 
non-Code law. 
C. The Answer Outside the Code 
A substantial body of law holding that repair warranties are breached 
only upon the seller's failure to repair does not find its root in the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Although non-Code law cannot conclusively 
the "goods" term in U.C.C. § 2-725(2). See Standard Alliance, 587 F.2d at 821 n.17; cf. Glen 
Peck Ltd. v. Fritsche, 651 P.2d 414, 415 (Colo. App. 1981). 
68. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. 
69. Two cases, Space Leasing Assocs. v. Atlantic Bldg. Sys., Inc., 144 Ga. App. 320, 325, 
241 S.E.2d 438,441 (1977), and Shapiro v. Long Island Lighting Co., 71 A.D.2d 671,418 N.Y.S.2d 
948 (1979), can be said to be both sources of non-Code case law and instances in which a court, 
interpreting § 2-725, drew on non-Code law. See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. 
70. U.C.C. § 1-103 is entitled "Supplementary General Principles of Law Applicable" and 
provides in full: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of 
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal 
and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other 
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions." Professor Summers has made 
a persuasive case for interpreting U.C.C. § 1-103 to allow courts to modify and create exceptions 
to Code provisions where equitable principles are involved. See Summers, General Equitable 
Principles under Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 906, 935 
(1978); see also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 20 (§ 1-103 ;mposes a "duty" to 
apply general equitable principles unless displaced); Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
125 Ga. App. 462,467, 188 S.E.2d 250, 253, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 771, 775 (1972); 
E. RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITY AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES 13-14 (1975) ("[e]quity will 
not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy"; "[e]quity regards substance rather than form"). 
71. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) requires, in all breach of contract actions, that the cause of action 
accrue when the breach occurs. As is the case with the § 2-725(1) four year rule, see supra note 
5, this requirement is general and would seem to apply in any contract action involving the sale 
of goods. Thus, any non-Code rule establishing an action accrual date different than the date 
of breach or establishing a different limitations period would be displaced by the Code. 
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establish· that repair warranties are breached upon failure to repair, 
this body of law can provide a sound basis for such a conclusion. 
1. Warranties Ineligible for Code Treatment- Several courts con-
sidering warranties that were or are ineligible for Code treatment have 
concluded that an action accrues on a repair obligation only upon the 
seller's failure to repair. In one case, the court considered a contract7 2 
for which an action had accrued before the Code's effective date in 
Missouri. 73 The court found that the contract, which provided that 
the goods would meet certain specifications and that the defendant 
would remedy defects that appeared within one year of a specified date, 
had been breached, if at any time, on the day one year after that date. 74 
Thus, the limitations period had begun at the end of the interval during 
which defendant had agreed to remedy any defects. 75 In an earlier case, 
the parties had executed two agreements, one in which def end ant had 
promised to build a silo in a "substantial and workmanlike manner," 
and one in which def end ant had promised "to repair or replace defects 
free of charge for a period of ten years." 16 Although the court found 
that the first promise had been breached upon completion of construc-
tion when defendant had failed to build the silo in a workmanlike man-
ner, it found that the repair promise had "continued" for ten years 
after completion, so that the action on this promise was not barred 
by the statute after this ten year period. 77 Finally, in a recent non-
Code case, a home builder had contracted to remedy defects called 
to its attention within one year of the closing date. 78 The court found 
that the cause of action had not accrued until the defendant had re-
72. See supra note 47. 
73. See Baldwin Plaza Corp. v. H.B. Deal Constr. Co., 462 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Mo. 1971). 
74. Id. at 688-89; cf. Neal v. Laclede Gas Co., 517 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) 
(citing Ballwin Plaza) (action for breach of one-year "guarantee" did not accrue until end of 
guarantee period during which defendant must have had opportunity to make repairs). 
75. 462 S.W.2d at 689-90. But see id. at 689 (statute provided that cause of action accrued 
when damage "capable of ascertainment"). 
76. See Krueger v. V.P. Christianson Silo Co., 206 Wis. 460, 460-61, 240 N.W. 145. 145 (1932). 
77. 206 Wis. at 462-63, 240 N.W. at 146; see also Fowler v. A & A Co., 262 A.2d 344, 347-48 
(D.C. 1970) (home improvement "guarantee," construed as "promise to do whatever 
is necessary, including repair of improperly performed work, to provide the guaranteed dry base-
ment," breached only upon total repudiation of the contract). In Kaiser Cement & Gypsum 
Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 35 Cal. App. 3d 948, I 11 Cal. Rptr. 210 (1973), apparently 
a pre-Code case, the court found that a "warranty to repair" was breached when the manufac-
turer indicated that the goods were not in need of repair. Id. at 957-59, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 215-17. 
Because the manufacturer had offered separate, prospective, express no-defects warranties, however, 
the court held that the limitations period had not begun until the purchaser had discovered the 
defect. Id. at 958-61, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 217-19. 
78. See Spinoso v. Rio Rancho Estates, Inc., 96 N.M. 5, 7, 626 P.2d 1307, 1309 (1981). 
In Spinoso, the case was beyond the scope of the Code presumably because the contract related 
to construction of a home, which is not a "good" under U.C.C. § 2-105(1). 
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fused to cure the defect. 79 Thus, cases in which the Code was not 
available for application indicate that the statute of limitations for repair 
provisions begins to run only upon failure to repair. 
2. The Repair Warranty as Exception to Code Action Accrual Date 
Provisions- Even in cases in which the Code might otherwise have 
been applicable some courts have found that repair provisions are 
excepted from ordinary Code action accrual date requirements. One 
court found that although a breach of warranty generally occurs upon 
delivery, in the case of repair warranties, ''it is the refusal to remedy 
within a reasonable time, or a lack of success in the attempts to remedy 
which would constitute a breach of warranty." 80 Thus, the action could 
accrue only after the seller failed to repair. Although the court quoted 
(in a footnote) section 2-725(2) in full, it avoided any mention of the 
future performance exception. 81 Perhaps because it realized that repair 
provisions do not promise performance of the goods as required by 
Code language, 82 the court cited non-section 2-725 precedent as authority 
for giving the repair provision prospective treatment. 83 
In two other cases, 84 the courts implicitly established an exception 
79. 96 N.M. at 9 & n.3, 626 P.2d at 1311 & n.3. 
SO. See Space Leasing Assoc. v. Atlantic Bldg. Systems, 144 Ga. App. 320, 325, 241 S.E.2d 
438, 441 (1977) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The provision in question was a six-
year warranty of "workmanship and material" under which the seller's "obligation [was) to 
furnish to the building site replacement material" in case of defect. 144 Ga. App. at 321, 241 
S.E.2d at 439. 
SI. Id. at 324-25 n.3, 241 S.E.2d at 439 n.3. 
82. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16. 
83. The court cited Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250 
(1972); General Motors Corp. v. Halco Instruments, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 630, 185 S.E.2d 619 
(1971); and Ford Motor Corp. v. Gunn, 123 Ga. App. 550, 181 S.E.2d 694 (1971). 
84. See Dennin v. General Motors Corporation, 78 Misc. 2d 451, 357 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1974); Shapiro v. Long Island Lighting Co., 71 A.D.2d 671,418 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1979). 
In Dennin, defendant-manufacturer argued that a one-year warranty promising that the product 
was not defective and that the manufacturer would correct defects in "material and workman-
ship" constituted a contractual limitation of the limitations period. 78 Misc. 2d at 452, 357 N.Y.S.2d 
at 670. See U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (quoted supra note 3). While the court noted§ 2-725, it ignored 
the future performance of the goods exception, finding that the warranty 
establishe[d] by its plain language a period during which a cause of action might accrue 
for failure to repair or replace a defect in material or workmanship. By this warranty 
if a covered defect is brought to the attention of the seller during this period and the 
seller fails to repair, or at its option replace the part, a cause of action in favor of 
the buyer arises upon which he may sue for a period of four years thereafter. 
78 Misc. 2d at 452, 357 N. Y .S.2d at 670 (emphasis added). 
In Shapiro, ·the court found that a ten-year guarantee against "tank failure" (arguably a war-
ranty of product performance) did not promise performance of the product under U.C.C. § 
2-725(2) and thus that the limitations period had expired at delivery. 71 A.D.2d at 671, 418 
N.Y.S.2d at 950. The court noted, however, that the warranty contained a promise that the 
manufacturer would replace the product if it developed a leak within ten years after installation. 
Id. Based on this provision, the court found that plaintiff had a cause of action that was not 
barred: "Because the contract warranty is good for 10 years by its own terms, it is evident that 
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to the Code's requirements, finding that the language of the repair 
provision itself revealed the parties' intent to create a future obligation. 85 
Thus, a non-Code explanation - the parties' own agreement - was 
offered for giving the repair provision prospective treatment. 86 
3. Breach of Repair Warranty Possible Only Where Seller Has Failed 
to Remedy Defects- Many courts, without addressing the statute of 
limitations question, have found that a repair warranty is not breached 
until the seller has had an opportunity to remedy defects and has 
failed to do so. 87 These findings are consistent with the often quoted 
rule that where the agreement provides the seller the right to remedy 
defects, a finding of breach does not require the buyer to permit the 
seller ''to tinker with the article indefinitely in the hope that it may 
ultimately be made to comply with the warranty." 88 If the seller may 
it survives the four year statute of limitations in some respects. The seller has promised to replace 
a defective unit for IO years and that promise is undoubtedly enforceable by the buyer." Id. 
(emphasis added). Thus, the statute had not run on the IO-year promise to replace. (The decision 
indicates that ten years had not passed since ·delivery of the product. Nevertheless, because the 
guarantee was held to be enforceable more than four years after the delivery of the product, 
the accrual date for the purposes of the statute of limitations must have been thought to have 
been later than the date of delivery.) 
85. In at least one case a court has adopted without§ 2-725 analysis the plain language rule 
found in Dennin and Shapiro. See Lieb v. Milne, 95 N.M. 716, 625 P.2d 1233 (1980). In Lieb, 
where defendant was bound by a warranty to repair, the court ruled that "if Milne refused 
to provide the warranted service, the action was perfected at that time-subject only to the statutory 
time limit for filing an action." Id. at 720, 625 P .2d at 1237 (emphasis added) (citing Dennin 
v. General Motors Corp., 78 Misc. 2d 451, 357 N.Y.S. 668 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) ("plain 
language")). Cf. Ballwin Plaza Corp. v. H.B. Deal Constr. Co., 462 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Mo. 
1971) ("language" of contract, specifications, and defendant's letter to plaintiff). 
86. Cf. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (effect of Code's provisions may be varied by the parties, except 
as otherwise provided in the Code). 
87. See Rose v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 212 Cal. App. 2d 755, 763, 28 Cal. Rptr. 185, 190 
(1963); Allen v. Brown, 181 Kan. 301,308,310 P.2d 923,928 (1957); Draffin v. Chrysler Motors 
Corp., 252 S.C. 348, 352, 166 S.E.2d 305, 308 (1969); Cannon v. Pulliam Motor Co., 230 S.C. 
131, 140, 94 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1956); see also Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp. v. Allis-Chalmers 
Mfg. Co., 35 Cal. App. 3d 948, 958-59, 111 Cal. Rptr. 210,217 (1973); Patron Aviation, Inc. 
v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 154 Ga. App. 13, 16, 267 S.E.2d 274, 278 (1980) (quoting Space Leas-
ing Assocs. v. At!. Bldg. Sys., 144 Ga. App. 320, 325, 241 S.E.2d 438, 441 (1977)); Ford Motor 
Co. v. Gunn, 123 Ga. App. 550, 551, 181 S.E.2d 694, 696 (1971); Mueller v. Keeley, 165 Neb. 
243, 259, 85 N.W.2d 309, 318 (1957); Kure v. Chevrolet Motor Div., 581 P.2d 603, 608 (Wyo. 
1978); cf. Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 374 (E.D. 
Mich. 1977); Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 426 (D. Del. 1973) (failure to 
repair is breach under warranty to repair); Courtesy Ford Sales, Inc. v. Farrior, 53 Ala. App. 
94, 102, 298 So.2d 26, 33, IS U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 85, 91 (1974) (same) Seely v. White 
Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 14, 403 P.2d 145, 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 20, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Callaghan) 915, 918 (1965) (same); Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 
462,467, 188 S.E.2d 250,253, IO U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 771,776 (1972) (same); Givan 
v. Mack Truck, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 243,247 (Mo. App. 1978) (same); Ford Motor Co. v. Puskar, 
394 S.W.2d I, 14 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (same), modified on other grounds, 417 S.W.2d 262 
(Tex. I 967). 
88. 77 C.J.S. Sales§ 340 (1952); see Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 12 Wash. App. 161, 
165,528 P.2d 992,995 (1974) (and cases cited therein), rev'd in part on other grounds, 86 Wash. 
2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975); Kure v. Chevrolet Motor Div., 581 P.2d 603, 608 (Wyo. 1978) 
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not tinker indefinitely, he is probably permitted to tinker for a 
reasonable time without being in breach. Thus, the seller is not in breach 
during the time before the reasonable repair period has elapsed, in-
cluding the time before the seller has been notified of a defect. Although 
these cases do not address the question of when the statute of limita-
tions begins to run, they do establish the date of breach. Because the 
date of breach is the date at which the limitations period begins under 
section 2-725, 89 under these cases the statute of limitations would begin 
to run on the date of failure to repair. 
II. THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF A SENSIBLE ACTION 
ACCRUAL DATE FOR REPAIR WARRANTIES 
In order to arrive at a sensible solution to the problem of when an 
action accrues for repair warranties, it is necessary to consider impor-
tant policies furthered by applying a failure-to-repair rule to such war-
ranties. It is also necessary to examine the objectives of the on-delivery 
rule and determine whether this rule serves those objectives in the con-
text of repair warranties. 
A. Policies Served by a Failure-to-Repair Rule 
Two policies are served by application of a failure-to-repair rule 
to repair provisions: such a rule allows the limitations period to begin 
only when the seller has breached its obligation; and such a rule gives 
a repair provision prospective treatment in a manner consistent with 
the purpose of the Code's future performance exception. 
1. Under a Failure-to-Repair Rule an Action Accrues Only When 
the Buyer May Sue for Failure to Repair- A failure-to-repair rule 
would be in accord with the sensible and almost universal principle 
that the statute of limitations begins to run only when the aggrieved 
party has the present right to sue. 90 A repair provision requires the 
(and authorities cited therein). It is also well established that "if the contract so stipulates, the 
seller's liability ... does not attach until he has had an opportunity to remedy defects, and 
where such opportunity is afforded him his failure or refusal fixes his liability." 77 C.J.S. Sales 
§ 340 (1952). Accord General Motors Corp. v. Halco Instruments, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 630, 635, 
185 S.E.2d 619, 622 (1971); Russo v. Hilltop Lincoln-Mercury, 479 S.W.2d 211, 212-13 (Mo. 
App. 1972); Hole v. General Motors Corp., 83 A.D.2d 715,717,442 N.Y.S.2d 638,640 (1981); 
see also 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions§ 136 (1948 & Supp. 1983) (where warranty relates 
to future event, action does not accrue until occurrence of that event); Au v. Au, 63 Hawaii 
210,219,626 P.2d 173, 180 (1981) (same); Brown v. Ellison, 304 N.W.2d 197,200 (Iowa 1981) 
(same). 
89. See supra text accompanying note 36. 
90. See Ballwin Plaza Corp. v. H.B. Deal Constr. Co., 462 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Mo. 1971); 
Continental Casualty Co. v. Grabe Brick Co .. I Ariz. App. 214,217,401 P.2d 168, 171 (1965) 
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seller (expressly or by implication) to repair only when a defect in the 
goods appears. Unlike the seller who warrants that the goods are cur-
rently free from defects, the seller who promises to repair has no obliga-
tion unless and until a defect manifests itself. As a result, the buyer 
cannot sue until the seller has attempted to repair after the appearance 
of any defect. 91 Hence, the limitations period should not begin until 
the seller's attempt to repair has been unsuccessful. 
It might be objected that the Code drafters decided to apply an on-
delivery rule in many cases in which the plaintiff has not suffered discern-
ible damage at delivery. Code section 2-725(2) emphasizes this possi-
bility by providing that the action accrues "when the breach occurs, 
regardless of the aggrieved party's knowledge of the breach. " 92 
Nonetheless, this language does not require that an action for breach 
of a repair promise accrue at delivery. Because the seller has no repair 
obligation at delivery, no breach of the repair promise, known or 
unknown to the buyer, can occur at delivery. 93 Thus, the action should 
not be held to accrue at delivery. 
(quoting I C.J.S. Actions§ 124(a) (1936); Amy v. City of Dubuque, 98 U.S. 470, 476 (1879)); 
Grand Island School Dist. No. 2 v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 562, 279 N.W.2d 603, 606 
(1979) ("traditional rule"); Neal v. Laclede Gas Co., 517 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Mo. App. 1974); 
Gabriel v. Al habbal, 618 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (and cases cited therein) ("general 
rule of contract law"). Even if the purchaser's claim is characterized as a remedy, it is commonly 
accepted that "[w]here there is no present right to pursue [that] remedy against a party, but 
such right arises only on the doing of an act by him which puts him in default, the statute 
runs only from the default." 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions§ 110 (1948). 
91. "When the existence of an obligation is conditioned upon some event or contingency, 
the cause of action accrues when, and only when, such event or contingency happens unless 
by interference of one of the parties its happening is prevented." I C.J .S. Actions§ 124(c) (1936). 
See also Ginn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 119, 122 (5th Cir. 1969); Rogers 
v. Cowley, FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 199,178, at 95,686 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Nicholson v. Nation-
wide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 1046, 1052 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Kaufman v. Albin, 447 
A.2d 761, 763 (Del. Ch. 1982); Matchett v. Rose, 36 Ill. App. 3d 638, 648, 344 N.E.2d 770, 
778 (1976); Kielb v. Couch, 149 N.J. Super. 522, 528-29, 374 A.2d 79, 82-83 (Law Div. 1977); 
John J. Kassner & Co. v. City of New York, 46 N.Y.2d 544, 550, 389 N.E.2d 99, 102, 415 
N.Y.S.2d 785, 788 (1979); Bernstein v. Allstate Ins. Co., 56 Misc. 2d 341, 342, 288 N.Y.S.2d 
646, 648 (1968); Pitts v. Wetzel, 498 S.W.2d 27, 28-29 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); cf. U.C.C. § 
3-122 & Off. Com. I (action accrual date for commercial paper). But see State Farm Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Kilbreath, 419 So.2d 632, 633 (Fla. 1982), rev'g 401 So.2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); 
Dillon v. Lintz, 582 S.W.2d 394,395 (Tex. 1981), rev'g 568 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). 
Unless the contingency, here the buyer's presentation of evidence of a defect to the seller, 
occurs, the buyer cannot establish the obligation that would make possible the breach essential 
to any contract claim. See Hodge v. Service Mach. Co., 438 F.2d 347, 349 (6th Cir. 1971). 
Moreoever, even after the repair obligation exists, the seller must fail to fulfill that obligation 
before the buyer's action accrues. See, e.g., First Bank & Trust Co. v. Cannon, 164 Ga. App. 
449, 451, 297 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1982) (contract claim arises only when contract breached); G.P. 
Enters., Inc. v. Adkins, 543 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (cause of action on contract 
only where there is a breach). 
92. See U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (quoted supra note 3). Unlike the future performance exception 
and the on-delivery rule, this provision reaches the repair obligation under current law. See supra 
note 71. 
93. Where the warranty contains no promise regarding defects or where the seller's obliga-
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2. A Failure-to-Repair Rule is Consistent with the Purpose of the 
Section 2-725(2) Future Performance Exception- Regardless of the 
time at which the buyer may sue on a repair obligation, the purpose 
of the section 2-725(2) exception is to give prospective warranties pro-
spective effect in the law of the statute of limitations. 94 Where a 
manufacturer promises to repair at the future time at which the goods 
are in need of repair, its promise is clearly as prospective as that of 
a manufacturer offering the typical prospective no-defects warranty 
- one that "promise[s] performance of the product not merely at the 
moment of purchase but at some future date as well." 95 While repair 
promises may not relate to the "product" in a fashion contemplated 
by the Code drafters, 96 such promises are ''representation[s] that 
something will be done in the future," and, as such, cannot "be true 
or false at the time when [they are] made." 97 Thus, as does the pro-
spective no-defects warranty, a promise to repair at a future time should 
receive the benefit of a statute of limitations that runs only after the 
tion is expressly limited to repair, there is simply no duty of which the purchaser can allege 
a breach before failure to repair. See Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 78 
A.D.2d 983, 984, 433 N.Y.S.2d 888, 889 (1980); see also supra notes 87-89 and accompanying 
text. While a buyer holding a no-defects warranty could at least theoretically assert an action 
for breach of warranty upon delivery - the defect (and thus damages) being present but not 
apparent - a buyer with only a right to repair hasn't a scintilla of present right to sue on the 
date of delivery. 
Even where a nonexclusive repair obligation is accompanied by a no-defects provision, no 
breach of the no-defects provision of real legal consequence occurs before failure to repair since 
the means identified for enforcing the seller's promise are repair and replacement. See Dennin 
v. General Motors Corp., 78 Misc. 2d 451,452, 357 N.Y.S.2d 668, 670 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974). 
Clearly where a dual no-defects/repair warranty is construed as giving the buyer no more than 
a right to repair, see e.g., Hansen v. F.M.C. Corp., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 828, 
832-33 (D. Kan. 1981); Voth v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 647, 651-52, 545 P.2d 
371, 374-75, 378 (1976); Shapiro v. Long Island Lighting Co., 71 A.D.2d 671,671,418 N.Y.S.2d 
948, 949-50 (1979); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Central Eng'g & Equip. Co., 611 P.2d 863, 
865, 871 (Wyo. 1980), even a theoretical breach at delivery should not be found. More impor-
tantly, though, no breach whatsoever of the repair obligation can occur at delivery because this 
obligation does not exist at delivery - it exists only in the event of a defect. Hence, the repair 
obligation may be given independent prospective treatment, especially where such obligation itself 
contains the time term. See generally supra note 41. 
94. See Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp., 440 F. Supp. 1088, 1101 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (§ 2-725(2) 
is consistent with pre-Code law that "[a] prospective warranty related to the future state of goods, 
and a cause of action for the breach of such a warranty accrued at the time the breach could 
have been discovered") (citations omitted). In addition, if the "performance of the goods" obstacle 
in § 2-725(2) is bypassed, repair provisions appear to be precisely within the language describing 
the second requirement of the exception .:_ that is, such provisions are always of such a nature 
that "discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance." See U.C.C. § 2-725(2) 
(quoted supra note 3). 
95. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 420 (discussing Rempe v. General Elec. 
Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 160, 254 A.2d 577 (Super. Ct. 1969)). 
96. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16. But see supra note 17. 
97. See Hanover Modular Homes, Inc. v. Scottish Inns of Am., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 888, 892 
(W.D. La. 1978). 
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seller's promise has actually been breached. 98 
Of course, if section 2-725 's policy of giving prospective effect to 
prospective warranties is to have meaning in the case of repair warran-
ties, the label attached to the repair promise cannot be allowed to deter-
mine when an action for breach of that promise is held to accrue. 
Regardless whether a repair promise is characterized as a remedy or 
as a warranty, it is a promise - a contractual obligation - to act 
in the future 99 that can be breached only in the future. To allow mere 
characterization of the repair promise as a remedy to prevent it from 
receiving its logically prospective construction 100 would constitute a 
return to the formalism 101 long abandoned by practical, modern law. 102 
98. Some courts have held that the statute of limitations is tolled while the seller attempts 
to repair the goods. See, e.g., Little Rock School Dist. v. Celotex Corp., 264 Ark. 757, 757, 
574 S.W.2d 669, 674 (1978); see also U.C.C. § 2-725(4). See generally Annot., 68 A.L.R.3d 
1277 (1976). This, however, is not the predominating view. See, e.g., Triangle Underwriters, Inc. 
v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 1979); Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson 
Co., 587 F.2d 813, 819 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979); KIF Dev. & Inv. 
Co. v. Williamson Crane & Dozer Corp., 367 So. 2d 1078, 1080 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Zahler 
v. Star Steel Co., 50 Mich. App. 386,390,213 N.W.2d 269, 270 (1973); see also Thalrose v. 
General Motors Corp., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1257, 1258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (cited 
in Zahler and Triangle Underwriters). Note, however, that the cases that hold that the statute 
of limitations is not tolled often involve simple warranties against defects that do not extend 
to future performance. Thus, breach is reasonably held to occur upon delivery. In any event, 
a jurisdiction willing to toll the statute of limitations during repairs, presumably because the 
buyer would not and could not sue during this period, might be receptive to the argument that 
the statute should not begin to run on a repair warranty until the seller has failed to repair. 
99. See Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 998, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778, 784, 
14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 610, 617 (1974) ("a promise to repair is an express warranty 
that the promise to repair will be honored") (citing Zoss v. Royal Chevrolet, Inc., 11 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 527, 532 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1972)), rev'd on other grounds, 50 A.D.2d 866, 
376 N. Y .S.2d 948 (1975). 
100. See supra notes 18, 23-30 and accompanying text; see also supra note 51. 
IOI. The late Professor Karl Llewellyn, the "chief draftsman" of the Code (especially Articles 
One and Two), see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 4-6, roundly criticized the "Formal 
Style": 
Sense, the ways of men with words, the ways of businessmen in dealing, these are ir-
relevant and literally inadmissible: they do not get into the hall, to be heard or con-
sidered. Generations of law students were introduced to their profession by way of these 
strange ideas, and courts have in consequence made actual decisions in their image, 
sometimes with a touch of patent Parkeian pleasure as the pretty little puzzle-pieces 
lock together to leave for hundreds of good business promises no legal container but 
the garbage can. 
K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, DECIDING APPEALS 39 (1960). 
102. Another important policy may be frustrated where these provisions are not given their 
intended effect in cases of warranties with a stated obligation period longer than four years. 
In such cases, if the delivery rule is applied, the purchaser may be denied the opportunity to 
redress a defect in the product during the portion of the period stated in the warranty that ex-
ceeds the limitations period. Under a five-year repair warranty, e.g.; supra note 4; cf. Shapiro 
v. Long Island Lighting Co., 71 A.D.2d 671,418 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1979) (JO-year warranty), once 
four years had passed, see U.C.C. § 2-725(2), the purchaser would be left with no means to 
enforce the warranty agreement. In effect, the purchaser would receive only four years of war-
ranty protection. And because, under such warranties, the only cause of action available to such 
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B. Using the Failure-to-Repair Rule to Meet the Goals 
of the On-Delivery Rule 
735 
Three general purposes are thought to be served by an on-delivery 
rule: 103 it provides a fixed limit beyond which there can be no liability 
for breach of warranty; it protects manufacturers from unfounded suits; 
and it reflects the nature of the warranty as primarily promising a cer-
tain condition of the goods at delivery. These purposes, however, are 
best served in the context of nonprospective no-defects warranties, and 
are much less persuasive as justifications for an on-delivery rule in the 
case of repair warranties. 
J .. The Failure-to-Repair Rule Places a Time Limit on Suits-
Application of a failure-to-repair rule to repair warranties would allow 
a seller to gain the certain knowledge as to the last possible date of suit 1 04 
a purchaser is an action claiming that the manufacturer has failed to repair as warranted, see 
Rochester Welding Supply Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 78 A.D.2d 983, 984, 433 N.Y.S.2d 888, 
889 (1980), the purchaser's action for breach of warranty would be time barred before he ever, 
in fact, had a cause of action. 
Yet another undesirable consequence of application of the on-delivery rule is apparent where the 
parties have limited the statute of limitations by contract, as permitted under U.C.C. § 2-725(1). 
In the case of an agreement to limit the limitations period to one year, see, e.g., Standard Alliance 
Indus. v. Black Clawson Co., 587 F.2d 813, 818 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 
(1979), if the purchaser fails to notify the manufacturer before the one year period has elapsed, 
the purchaser's cause of action for breach of warranty to repair is barred by the explicit state-
ment in the warranty that the manufacturer's obligation exists only for a one year period. Assuming, 
however, that the defect manifested itself after 364 days, that the purchaser immediately notified 
the manufacturer of the defect, and that, at that point, the manufacturer refused to repair, under 
the on-delivery rule, the purchaser would have only one day to file suit. Even if the purchaser were 
allowed a reasonable period of time - perhaps a few weeks - after the manufacturer's failure 
to repair in which he might file suit, the result would be unfair. It is doubtful that the drafters 
of the Code and the legislatures of the states contemplated a limitations period of only days 
or weeks, even where the parties had expressly agreed to limit the limitations period to one year. 
If the parties have agreed to a one year limitations period, any reasonable ruling would allow 
the purchaser a full year during which he might file suit after the manufacturer has failed to 
fulfill his obligations, regardless of the date of delivery. 
103. Statutes of limitations in general are often justified in terms of the legal system's need 
for fresh evidence. See Special Project, supra note 20, at 269 & n.1013 (citing 75 W. VA. L. 
REv. 201, 206 (1972); Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 
1177, 1185 (1950)). This rationale should play no role where there is no evidence available at 
the early point at which breach might otherwise be held to occur. While an on-delivery rule 
furthers the fresh evidence policy in the case of a no-defects warranty, in the case of a suit 
for breach of warranty to repair, there is simply no evidence (not even undiscovered evidence, 
see supra note 93) available at the delivery date to show breach of the repair obligation. Similarly, 
the justification for statutes of limitations that plaintiffs should not be rewarded for "sleeping" 
on their rights, see Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952); McCroskey 
v. Bryant Air Conditioning Co., 524 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tenn. 1975), or protected from "ig-
norance" of their rights, see Brown v. Ellison, 304 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 1981); Krueger v. 
V.P. Christianson Silo Co., 206 Wis. 460, 240 N.W. 145, 146 (1932), is inapposite here. 
104. See Jackson v. General Motors Corp., 223 Tenn. 12, 18, 441 S.W.2d 482, 484, cert. 
denied, 396 U.S. 942 (1969) (on-delivery rule prevents possibility that "there would never be 
a time that a suit could not be brought"); cf. J .. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, at 422 
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that a fixed limit 1 05 on-delivery rule would allow. If the seller offered 
a one year warranty, a failure-to-repair rule would require that the max-
imum period of potential liability be five years 106 - the one-year repair 
obligation period plus the four year limitations period. If a defect 
manifested itself on the last day of the twelfth month of the warranty 
and the purchaser brought the defect to the attention of the manufac-
turer on that day, at which point the manufacturer failed to repair, the 
purchaser could bring an action no more than four y:ears later. As a result, 
there is no possibility of indefinite liability. 107 
2. A Failure-to-Repair Rule Would Not Subject Sellers to Increased 
Risk of Unfounded Suits- Although a policy of preventing unfound-
ed suits 108 is not, on its face, unreasonable, a buyer holding a repair 
warranty is no more likely to pursue an unfounded claim- than is a 
buyer holding an ordinary prospective no-defects warranty. While an 
on-delivery rule would protect a seller from unfounded suits brought 
more than four years after delivery, this policy argues for an early 
action accrual date in any case. If suits are to be barred because they 
are potentially unfounded, there is no reason to distinguish between 
repair warranties and warranties currently given prospective treatment 
under the Code. Moreover, to the extent that this argument assumes 
that many claims. are spurious because the failure of the product is 
due to lack of proper product use or care 109 it is unpersuasive here; 
most warranties themselves disclaim any obligation to repair where pro-
duct failure is caused by abuse, misuse, or lack of proper care. 110 Even 
where the warranty does not contain such a disclaimer, product failure 
due to abuse is most likely not within the terms of the usual repair 
warranty provision promising to repair products that fail due to a 
defect. 111 
3. Repair Provisions do not Warrant the Condition of the Goods 
at the Time of Delivery- An on-delivery rule that is ordinarily ap-
(both U.C.C. § 2-607 and statutes of limitations give the seller the "mind balm" of being able 
to close his books on the past at a given point); Standard Alliance Indus. v. Black Clawson 
Co., 587 F.2d 813, 820 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979) (statutes of limitations 
allow seller to be free of "worry" after a certain point); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (5th ed. 
I 979) (statutes of limitation are statutes of "repose"). 
105. See Alris, Inc. v. Gojer, 75 Misc. 2d 962,965, 349 N.Y.S.2d 948, 952 (1973); accord 
Raymond-Dravo-Langenfelder v. Microdot, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 614, 618 (D. Del. 1977); see also 
Centennial Ins. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 74 Mich. App. 169, 172,253 N.W.2d 696, 697 (1977). 
106. Of course, the maximum period during which a seller might be sued under any warranty, 
absent tolling, see supra note 98, is computed by adding the warranty period to the limitations 
period. 
107. See also supra note 41. 
108. See, e.g., Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340,346,253 N.E.2d 207, 
210, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 495 (1969). 
109. Id. 
110. See, e.g., supra note 4. 
111. Id. 
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plied ''because the condition of the goods at the time of delivery is 
central" 112 is not sensibly applied to repair warranties. Because the seller 
warrants in the usual situation only that, at delivery, the goods will 
conform to specifications, an on-delivery rule may often be reasonable. 
The condition of the goods at delivery, however, is not central to the 
manufacturer's obligation under a repair warranty. Indeed, the presence 
of a repair provision indicates that the manufacturer recognizes the 
possibility that the goods may at some future point require repair -
the warranty assumes that the condition of the goods may vary from 
that which is expected and warrants only that when such variation is 
apparent needed repairs will be made. 113 Hence, the objective of the 
on-delivery rule that the action accrual date should reflect the nature 
of the warranty in question is met where a failure-to-repair rule is ap-
plied to repair warranties. 
III. A SUGGESTION FOR AMENDMENT OF CURRENT CODE LANGUAGE 
Because repair warranties are of a prospective nature they should 
be accorded the same treatment in the law of the statute of limitations 
as that accorded prospective no-defects warranties under Code section 
2-725(2)'s future performance exception. Nonetheless, the courts have 
given repair warranties such treatment only infrequently. The construc-
tion of repair provisions as remedy limitations significantly reduces 
the likelihood that such provisions will receive the benefit of a limita-
tions period beginning only at the date of failure to repair. 114 Amend-
ment of the current language of section 2-725 is one means of solving 
this problem. 
A. The Proposed Amendment 
The following amendment (proposed subsections (5), (6), (7), (8), 
and (9)) is suggested: 
112. See Special Project, supra note 20, at 270. Two phrases in the § 2-725(2) language con-
firm the impression that the on-delivery rule exists for this reason. First, the subsection's first 
sentence states that the "cause of action accrues when the breach occurs regardless of the ag-
grieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach." U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (emphasis added). This 
language appears to be designed for the situation where the seller's promise relates to the state 
of the goods at the time of delivery and where a defect is not apparent at that time. Second, 
the future performance exception requires that "discovery of the breach must await the time 
of such performance ... " Id. (emphasis added). This language also seems to contemplate a 
breach that occurs at delivery in the form of an undiscovered defect. 
113. "Underlying the warranty to make needed repairs is the assumption that the goods may 
fall into disrepair or otherwise malfunction." Owens v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 
992, 999, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778, 785, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 610, 617 (1974), rev'd on 
other grounds, 50 A.D.2d 866, 376 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1975). 
114. See supra notes 9-30 and accompanying text. 
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(5) A repair-replacement warranty, as defined in subsection 
(6) of this section, shall be construed as a warranty that 
explicitly extends to future performance of the goods for 
the purposes of subsection (2) of this section 
(6) A repair-replacement warranty is a written promise made 
by the seller to the buyer containing both of the following 
terms: 
(a) an explicit statement that the seller will repair or 
replace the goods in the event that a defect becomes 
apparent; 
(b) an explicit statement of the time period, even if this 
period is a "lifetime" or is otherwise without limit, 
for which the seller's obligation to repair or replace 
exists. 
(7) In the case of a repair-replacement warranty, as defined 
in subsection (6) of this section, including a warranty that 
also promises that the goods are not defective, discovery 
of the breach, for the purposes of subsection (2) of this 
section, shall not be found to have occurred until the seller 
failed to repair within a reasonable time after the seller 
received notice of the defect(s). 
(8) The presence in a warranty of a promise that the goods 
are not defective shall not preclude construction of such 
warranty as a repair-replacement warranty under this sec-
tion so long as the warranty satisfies the requirements of 
subsection (6) of this section. 
(9) This section does not alter the law on warranties implied 
in law. 
B. Commentary 
This amendment 115 would establish that promises to repair for a 
115. Two commentators have offered a proposal intended to resolve the problem of the pro-
per construction, under U.C.C. § 2-725, of "future performance warranties" generally, including 
warranties of the product itself and warranties of title. See Schmitt & Hanko, supra note 7, 
at 331-32. This proposal expressly gives present treatment - applies the on-delivery rule - to 
those warranties that would qualify as "warranties of description" under § 2-3 I 3(1)(b) or "war-
ranties of conformity" under § 2-313(1 )(c). Id. at 331. Prospective treatment under the Schmitt-
Hanko (S-H) proposal would be reserved for "express warrant[ies) by promise or affirmation 
(2-313(1)(a))." Id. The most important difference between the S-H proposal and the amendment 
offered here is that, given the prevailing construction of repair provisions as remedy limitations 
that cannot extend to future performance of the goods, see supra notes 18-30 and accompanying 
text, such provisions could not themselves be given prospective treatment under the S-H pro-
posal. Repair provisions would be denied such treatment under the S-H proposal because they 
fail to relate, as required by the proposal's explicit reference to § 2-313(1)(a), to the "goods." 
See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Although the repair provision may be a "promise 
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specified period (incidental to a sale of goods) are warranties for the 
purposes of Code section 2-725(2). Thus, even though such promises 
would not "relate to the goods" in the section 2-313 sense, 116 the need 
to apply non-Code action accrual date law to repair promises 111 would 
be obviated. In addition, and of more consequence, the amendment 
would require that repair warranties be given prospective treatment 
under the subsection (2) future performance exception. This would have 
the effect of codifying the rule that breach occurs and_ the statute of 
limitations begins to run only upon the manufacturer's failure to repair 
or replace in accordance with its warranty. 
A repair warranty that contained a promise that the goods were not 
defective would receive similar prospective treatment if that warranty 
also contained both a promise that the seller would repair the goods 
in the event of a defect and an explicit statement of the duration of 
this obligation. A term requiring repair warranties containing promises 
that the goods are not defective to state that repair is the seller's sole 
obligation is not included because such a requirement is thought to 
be too restrictive. 118 
Subsection (7) would make it clear that buyers holding repair war-
ranties have a reasonable period of time to secure repairs during which 
or affirmation" as required by § 2-313(l)(a) and the S-H proposal, it does not relate to the 
goods and cannot, therefore, be a "warranty" - a promise that the "goods shall conform." 
See U.C.C. § 2-313(l)(a). 
A second difference is that the S-H proposal would apply a discovery-of-defect rule to warran-
ties it reached - the limitations period would begin when the purchaser discovered the defect. 
See Schmitt & Hanko at 331. The amendment offered here would allow the action to accrue 
on a repair warranty only upon the manufacturer's failure to repair. 
Finally, the S-H proposal would give many implied warranties prospective treatment. Id. The 
amendment proposed here does not abandon the sensible view that a manufacturer should not 
be held to a delayed limitations period where it has not promised future performance. See supra 
note 5. The S-H proposal's drafters have attempted to prevent the inadvertent creation of im-
plied warranties that would receive prospective treatment by including a term stating that "[n]othing 
·in this section affects the right to exclusion or modification of warranties (2-3 I 6)." See Schmitt 
and Hanko at 331. This attempt will fail, however, in many situations. The Magnuson-Moss 
Warranty Act, enacted one year after the S-H proposal was offered, prohibits disclaimers of 
many implied warranties where a supplier of a consumer product offers any express warranty. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (1982). Thus, if the manufacturer offered a warranty - even an inten-
tionally nonprospective no-defects warranty - its disclaimer of implied warranty would be in-
valid and any warranties implied in law would often be treated as prospective. Ironically, because, 
unlike the Code, the Magnuson-Moss Act makes repair provisions warranties, see supra note 
35, a manufacturer that offered a repair provision would often also effectively offer a prospec-
tive implied warranty. This would not be because the repair provision was a remedy limitation 
for the implied warranty. (Often this cannot be the case. See supra note 19.) The action accrual 
date would be later than delivery only because legally required implied warranties would receive 
prospective treatment under the S-H proposal. Nevertheless, the repair provision itself would 
not receive prospective treatment. Thus, a later-than-delivery action accrual date would be used 
only because of the proposal's questionable inclusion of implied warranties in the group of war-
ranties that would receive prospective treatment. 
116. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
117. See supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text. 
118. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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the statute would not run. 119 Under subsection (9), there would be no 
change in the sensible current rule that an implied warranty cannot 
receive prospective treatment. 1 20 
By way of this amendment, the parties' reasonable expectations that 
no breach could occur unless and until the seller failed to repair, and 
that the statute of limitations for the purchaser's action on the war-
ranty could not begin to run before this point, would not be 
disappointed. 121 
CONCLUSION 
Great uncertainty exists whether a given court will find that the limita-
tions period for a repair warranty begins at the time of delivery or 
only after the purchaser's attempt to secure repairs has been unsuc-
cessful. Courts applying the Code to repair warranties have reached 
conflicting results based on generally unsatisfactory analysis. Courts 
looking beyond the language of the Code have held that breach of 
a repair warranty - and consequently the triggering of the statute of 
limitations - can occur only after the manufacturer has failed to repair. 
Policy considerations support the results reached by these courts, and 
argue for an amendment to Code section 2-725 that at once recognizes 
119. Some jurisdictions currently toll the statute of limitations during repairs. See supra note 
98. Current subsection (4) of U.C.C. § 2-725 acknowledges this fact, providing in part: "This 
section [§ 2-725 as a whole) does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations 
... " U .C.C. § 2-725(4). In a jurisdiction that tolled the statute during repairs, of course, the 
proposed changes would eliminate only the time between delivery and the initiation of repair 
efforts from the computation of the breach-to-suit period. In a jurisdiction that did not toll 
the statute during repairs, any ruling that would require the inclusion of the repair period in 
the computation of the breach-to-suit period would not apply to repair-replacement warranties. 
In any case, there would be no actual inconsistency between the proposed changes and subsec-
tion (4) because the proposed changes do not toll the statute. The statute would not run for 
any period before failure to repair. 
120. See supra note 5. 
121. It is possible that some manufacturers would be discouraged from providing repair pro-
visions if a failure-to-repair rule were applied to such provisions. Three considerations, however, 
make this seem less likely than one might suppose. First, a failure-to-repair rule would lengthen 
not the period of the manufacturer's obligation to repair, but only the period during which the 
manufacturer might be sued for failure to fulfill its warranty obligations. Second, under almost 
any theory as to why warranties take the form they do, the manufacturer has an economic incen-
tive to provide the written warranty terms it specifies, including repair provisions. See generally 
Priest, supra note 2. Where the manufacturer intends the repair provision to limit its obligation 
to the buyer in the event of defect to a specified time period, see U.C.C. § 2-719(I)(a); see 
also, e.g., supra note 4 (faucet warranty limited to replacement), it may consider a failure-to-
repair rule an acceptable exchange. Finally, a seller may prefer in some cases to avoid a finding 
of breach at delivery. If, for instance, a repair provision is found not to be exclusive, see, e.g., 
U.C.C. § 2-719(I)(b), (3) (insufficiently "express" or "unconscionable"), the seller may be liable 
for incidental and consequential damages from the date of delivery. A failure-to-repair rule would 
protect the seller from liability for damages occurring between the delivery date and the date 
of failure to repair. 
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the differences between repair warranties and no-defects warranties 
and satisfies the need for uniform treatment 122 in this unsettled area. 
-Carey A. De Witt 
122. See U.C.C. § 2-725, Official Comment (purposes). 

